In a chat with TOPICS Associate Editor Alex Myslinski, Jeffrey Williams talked about the bilingual White Paper that changed AmCham’s public profile and the responsibility that came with growing influence.
Jeffrey R. Williams served as AmCham’s chairman for two terms in 1997 and 1998 when he was Taiwan country head for American Express. During his tenure, the Chamber published its first bilingual Taiwan White Paper and expanded its advocacy on politically sensitive issues affecting U.S.-Taiwan economic relations. AmCham strongly supported Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and greater cross-Strait economic connectivity. Williams later served as CEO of Standard Chartered Taiwan and as president of Shenzhen Development Bank — the first foreigner to hold such a senior role at a Chinese bank. He was also the inaugural executive director at Harvard University’s Shanghai Center. Today he serves on corporate and nonprofit boards in the United States and across Greater China, including UBS SDIC Fund Management Co. in China and PharmaEssentia Corporation, as well as the Koo Foundation Sun Yat-Sen Cancer Center in Taipei.
Below are excerpts from the call, edited for brevity and clarity:
You lived and worked in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China during periods of extraordinary economic change. How would you describe the character of Taiwan during those different eras, particularly around your time as AmCham chairperson?
My first trip to Taiwan was in 1973 as a student during the martial law era. Between undergrad and graduate school, I spent a year in Beijing teaching at Peking University, then came back to Taiwan following business school in 1982.
By the ’90s, the democratization process in Taiwan was well underway. Having divided my career between Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong, I am struck by how successfully Taiwan has forged its own identity in the region.
Over the decades, Taiwan has consistently become more democratic and has shown itself to be a very responsible participant in the international order. There are still things to criticize, but Taiwan has become a very progressive society in many respects. China has taken a different path, and it’s a striking divergence from where we thought both places were headed.
When I started at Citibank, intellectual property rights protection was a big issue because Taiwan was famous as the home of piracy. Everything was being pirated — books, Rolex watches, Apple computers, all kinds of things. My first home computer was a “Golden Formosa II” — an exact copy of an Apple II. Today, one of Taiwan’s strong points for foreign and domestic investors alike is its effective IPR protection.
Everybody was worried when low-end manufacturing started moving to China. What was Taiwan going to do if it lost all the shoes and apparel? But Taiwan found a completely new place in the world economy through very high-tech industries — not just assembling Apple computers but really operating on the cutting edge. Taiwan has made that transition quite successfully. Until recently, it has been a well-kept secret, but the emergence of TSMC as a key player in the AI industry rollout has drawn new attention to Taiwan and Taiwanese innovation.
What were AmCham’s central messages during your chairmanship, particularly in thinking about Taiwan’s long-term trajectory in the region? Which ideas have endured?
The business community wanted more direct access to the mainland, but government policies during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency were getting in the way.
One government policy that we supported was to seek to make Taiwan an Asia Pacific Regional Operating Center (APROC) by attracting global companies to put their Asia headquarters in Taiwan. The other was jie ji yong ren (戒急用忍), or “go slow, no haste” regarding the expansion of commercial links with China. Those two things fundamentally conflicted because few global companies were prepared to put an Asia-Pacific operating center in Taiwan if they could not move people or goods in and out of China.
Our parent corporations definitely supported Taiwan entering the WTO, but not without China also joining. Therefore, when we went on our Doorknock trips to Washington, our position was: “Don’t forget Taiwan.”
We also encouraged people in Washington not to use U.S.-Taiwan or U.S.-China relations as a “club” to beat up the other side. Don’t threaten China with “If you don’t do what I want, I’m going to do good things with Taiwan,” and don’t threaten Taiwan that “If you don’t do what I want, I’m going to do more with China,” because that’s not helpful to businesses on the ground.
Most of us assumed that China was on a trajectory to become more market-oriented and more open. That was the direction it took through the mid-2000s, but over the past decade the trend has reversed, with the Chinese Communist Party and government resuming a dominant role. Much of the liberalization we’d hoped would result from WTO entry never came to pass. Taking an example from my industry at that time, China was to fully open its credit card market within five years of WTO accession, which obviously never happened.
Nevertheless, based on what we knew at the time, I believe ours were the right positions. As businesspeople, we should always advocate for open markets and an open playing field in both Taiwan and China.
The Chamber’s first bilingual Taiwan White Paper brought an unexpected level of public and government attention. How did you navigate that fundamental shift in visibility, audience, and responsibility?
It was a watershed for the Chamber. We realized that if we were going to communicate our ideas locally, it made sense to communicate them in the local language.
So, we translated the White Paper into Chinese. We then followed our usual protocol, which was a visit to each government ministry to deliver the paper, followed by a press conference in Taipei. The atmosphere was totally friendly and polite. Afterwards, we proceeded to Washington for the Chamber’s “Doorknock.”
When we held our closing press conference in D.C., most of the attendees were members of the Taiwan press corps based in Washington. They each got a copy of the newly translated White Paper and focused on one section, detailing AmCham’s criticism of President Lee’s signature “Go Slow, No Haste” mainland policy, while also pointing out how it undermined the APROC development plan.
The Taiwan media quickly seized on it, describing the situation in terms such as “Foreigners go to Washington to complain.” We started to see negative news reports coming out of Taiwan even before we got on the plane to return home — because the White Paper was in Chinese, reporters could immediately skim it, run out of the room, and file their stories. Taiwan’s relationship with the United States is one of the most important things there is politically, so the story immediately rose to the top of the pile.
When I got back to Taipei, I rushed to an AmCham conference room packed with journalists, including many with TV cameras.
Shortly after, Vice Premier Chang Hsiao-yen (known then as John Chang — the surname was later changed to Chiang), called us into his office. AmCham had an excellent working relationship with him, especially when he was serving in the foreign ministry during the U.S. shift in diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. However, at this time, he was very upset about the wording and tone of the White Paper. We got a lecture for a good half hour about how our “outrageous” position on cross-Strait contacts would negatively impact Taiwan’s national security.
We had a banquet coming up, and Vice Premier Chang promised he would not attend. Meanwhile, I ended up on the cover of The Journal (新新聞) paired with the headline “AmCham Leader Dares to Criticize Lee Teng-hui.” Inside, Chang was quoted saying that AmCham was not behaving as we should — as guests in Taiwan.
Premier Vincent Siew was scheduled to be the keynote speaker at the banquet, and we were worried that he might cancel as well. This concern was misplaced: not only did he attend and give a gracious and supportive speech, but Chang attended as well. I apologized to the premier for the brouhaha — he signaled that it wasn’t an issue for him. “You foreigners just don’t understand the Taiwan press,” he said.
It was a valuable lesson. Presenting the White Paper in Chinese as well as English was good for communicating with the local media, officials, and public. But it also meant we had to pay special attention to how to frame issues for local audiences, outside of what were considered safe government and business circles.
Ironically, when direct cross-Strait air links were finally established in 2008, John Chiang (as he was now known) was prominently featured as a passenger on the inaugural flight!
As AmCham Taiwan marks its 75th anniversary, what do you believe has made the Chamber uniquely influential in Taiwan?
We need to start with the understanding that we’re a chamber of commerce. We’re not a political consultancy or political advocacy group. Our role is to serve our members — to help them expand their business and succeed in Taiwan by advocating for policies in both the United States and Taiwan that improve the business climate for American companies. The fundamental focus should be on the business environment and — if you draw a bigger circle around it — the quality-of-life environment for the people working in Taiwan.
AmCham punches above its weight in Taiwan for historical reasons — primarily the crucial role it played at the time of “derecognition” in 1979-80 in helping ensure continued smooth bilateral relations. There’s also the support we provided in the 1990s for Taiwan’s WTO accession. As a result, AmCham receives more attention than other chambers in the region — this has been AmCham Taiwan’s advantage. The challenge is to maintain the confidence of all stakeholders that AmCham is a reliable partner in helping Taiwan’s economy prosper.
