Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine program is establishing a new strategic hub in the Indo-Pacific with implications for Taiwan.

A distance of nearly 6,400 kilometers lies between Perth and Taipei, around 800 kilometers farther than that between New York and London. But what is now taking shape in Western Australia is set to be significant for Taiwan’s security. Up to 18 nuclear-powered submarines Australia plans to acquire will be maintained at Henderson, Perth’s industrial and maritime suburb.

Australia’s massive defense buildup is happening under AUKUS — the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that was launched in September 2021. AUKUS’s Pillar 1 is a commitment to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, first involving rotation of U.S. and UK subs to Western Australia, before Australia’s own vessels are built, initially in the UK and later in South Australia.

AUKUS Pillar 2’s first signature project, announced in late May 2026, focuses on payloads and enabling systems for uncrewed undersea vehicles, with delivery beginning in 2027. The project is intended to strengthen partners’ ability to protect critical seabed infrastructure and expand surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, strikes, mine-countermeasure, electronic-warfare, and anti-submarine capabilities.

Although Australia’s defense buildup is primarily designed to deter China from grabbing Australia’s vast mineral and agricultural resources, observers believe that AUKUS will positively affect the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan’s specific strategic environment. Much of that stems from the decisive advantage of nuclear submarines: their virtually unlimited range, sustained high speed, and the ability to remain submerged continuously for months on end. Taiwan could also benefit from enhanced protection of critical national seabed infrastructure. The island reported five undersea cable malfunctions allegedly caused by Chinese vessels last year, compared with three each in 2024 and 2023.

“Official AUKUS documents emphasize regional security and stability rather than explicitly targeting China, but its capability development and technological cooperation are widely viewed as responses to China’s growing military power and regional influence,” says Taipei-based Hung Tzu-chieh, an associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a public think tank.

“Through Pillar 1’s support for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and Pillar 2’s cooperation in advanced technologies, such as AI, cyber capabilities, quantum technologies, and autonomous systems, AUKUS will strengthen the military projection and joint operational capabilities of the U.S. and its allies in the Western Pacific,” says Hung.

Similarly, another observer argued that the AUKUS plan to sell Australia three early-production Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) would contribute to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

“A sale of three SSNs will allow Australia to maintain a constant patrol of one Virginia-class SSN that, with a high-speed dash, could arrive in the Taiwan theater within a few days, posing a serious threat to any PLA [Chinese military] blockade and invasion forces,” says Rick Fisher, senior fellow on Asian Military Affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, a think tank based in Alexandria, Virginia.

“Sale of early-production SSNs also allows for an earlier transfer to establish an Australian capability that gives Canberra the option to send a decisive force to the Taiwan Strait,” he says.

Jockeying for position

With total investment for AUKUS estimated at around US$255 billion over the next three decades, the establishment of the defense bloc has inevitably woken up supply chains. This awakening could be seen at the 2026 Indian Ocean Defence and Security Conference and Exhibition (IODS) in Perth in May 2026. The event brought together influential voices from across government, industry, and academia.

Alongside major industry players — such as Australian naval shipbuilder Austal, U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturer Raytheon, and the UK’s Rolls-Royce — dozens of small and medium-sized suppliers also showcased their capabilities. An example was Glenair, a Glendale, California-based manufacturer of high-reliability connectors and cables for mission-critical land, sea, air, and space applications. Glenair has maintained a longstanding presence in Australia; however, with the advent of AUKUS, its expansion has accelerated. A Glenair salesperson stresses that the company is sourcing materials exclusively from the United States, the UK, and Italy — a clear demarcation from China as a source of supply — to signal trustworthiness and security compliance.

“Substandard cable materials can compromise conductivity, cause fiber breakage, and interrupt power supply, with potentially catastrophic consequences, particularly in submarines,” the Glenair employee says.

“AUKUS increases demand for ‘Five Eyes’-compatible supply chains and strengthens the position of suppliers with verified provenance and security profiles,” he adds, referring to an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the United States.

Sweden-based MCT Brattberg, a manufacturer of sealings for cables and pipes passing through vertical partitions within a ship’s hull, also sees itself well-positioned to jump on the AUKUS bandwagon. The Australian subsidiary started in 2023, triggered by supply contracts for BAE Systems’ Hunter-class frigate program and Australian Submarine Cooperation’s Collins-class submarines. The former is a multi-billion-dollar project to build six advanced anti-submarine warfare frigates for the Royal Australian Navy, with the first frigate on track to enter service in 2032. The Collins-class submarines are Australia’s existing locally built diesel-electric submarines that are undergoing maintenance and service life extensions.

“We successfully entered into Australia aligned with Hunter-class timelines and established defense partnerships, and we expect continued participation across AUKUS-related submarine builds due to certifications and existing supply roles,” an MCT Brattberg employee says.

“Nevertheless, there is some concern about Australia maintaining a continuous strategic shipbuilding program to avoid past start-stop cycles,” he adds.

Implementation risks

That concern has its foundation in the grueling experience of German shipbuilder Lürssen, which was commissioned by Australia in 2017 to build the Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels. Lürssen Australia’s involvement was characterized by massive delays, as well as conflicts regarding weapons integration and contract cancellations. The fractured relationship with the Australian Department of Defence ultimately led the German parent company to withdraw completely from the country.

“The Australian government required Lürssen to split construction of the Arafuras between Henderson in Western Australia and Osborn in South Australia to help establish a continuous sovereign shipbuilding industry, which artificially complicated things due to the vast distance between the two locations,” says a veteran observer on the sidelines of the IODS.

“They also struggled with Australia’s weak industrial base and manpower shortages,” the observer says. Both are caused by Australia’s “shovel and ship” economic model of heavy reliance on resource-extractive industries, such as those for coal, iron ore, and critical minerals, and exporting them without processing. This approach has seriously discouraged domestic industrial investment.

Reinforcing that point, the Australian Defence Consultancy Group (ADCG), a service provider of security clearances for personnel of small and medium-sized enterprises that want to take part in defense programs, warns that the talent pool for Australian defense projects is critically small due to restrictive personnel regulations and a lack of competitiveness relative to the mining sector.

“The Australian government mandates that workers on defense projects must be exclusively Australian nationals whose entire background can be traced without any gaps, and this categorically excludes even close allies from the ‘Five Eyes’ and AUKUS nations,” an ADCG employee says.

“At the same time, employment in the mining sector is more attractive, which further complicates recruitment for the defense industry,” he adds. “The Australian government is doing too little to address this strategic personnel bottleneck, thereby seriously jeopardizing the feasibility of these projects.”

An employee of U.S. defense contractor Moog, for his part, identifies political direction-setting regarding U.S. knowledge transfer as another potential bottleneck for Australia’s submarine industrialization. He claims that U.S. policy under President Donald Trump creates ambiguity regarding whether the arrangement will remain limited to the export of goods or if genuine knowledge transfer and local implementation will take place within Australia.

“While there is certainly more momentum compared to five years ago, planning for industrialization is left fragile in the absence of firm commitments,” the Moog employee says.

“Without clear U.S. commitments regarding the scope of technology transfer and the industrial footprint in Australia, program development, supply chain establishment, and capacity planning remain at risk,” the employee says. “We must address this dependency and translate the available options into robust scenarios before committing capital.”

What key stakeholders say

At an IODS panel discussion, insiders delved into the challenges of delivering on the AUKUS commitments.

Alex Walsh, CEO of Australian Submarine Company (ASC), detailed ASC’s significant workforce expansion and the upskilling of Australians, including through training in Pearl Harbor, to support future submarine sustainment and build a sovereign nuclear capability.

Laura Hooks, a senior executive at the U.S.’s General Dynamics Mission Systems, stresses that AUKUS is already underway, with critical design choices being made now. “We must sprint to keep pace, especially on combat systems collaboration, using prototyping to resolve trilateral information-sharing barriers,” Hooks says.

Offering a Washington perspective as a former submariner, Brent Sadler, a naval warfare researcher at The Heritage Foundation, bluntly outlined near-term must-dos to sustain political will.

High on Sadler’s list was the urgent resolution of Henderson land issues to enable a critical dry dock for repairs by 2027 and the public naming of the first U.S. rotational submarine.

Representing Rolls-Royce Submarines, which will provide the nuclear reactors to power the AUKUS subs, Abi Clayton, the company’s president, describes a major production surge, with work already underway. But she says more can be done.

“We must scale from one reactor every three years to one per year, tripling capacity,” Clayton says. “Australia’s key challenge is building nuclear capability. We can replicate UK skills academies to train hundreds annually,” she adds, referring to a system of schools that train talent for that country’s nuclear sector.

Vice Admiral Sir Nick Hine, who leads the marine business of London-based Babcock International, which would also be heavily engaged in AUKUS, distilled the key to success down to three essentials: “the right people, materials, and infrastructure.”

“Industry still lacks all three,” Hine says. “Governments must finally let contracts spur private investment and action.” He adds that “the lack of an overall guiding person in Australia is another problem. Clear authority and accountability would improve deliverability.”