Global connectivity relies overwhelmingly on the vast network of undersea fiber-optic cables, carrying over 95% of international data traffic.
As geopolitical tensions rise and Taiwan faces mounting gray-zone threats from China, the vulnerabilities of these vital links are no longer theoretical. In response, the United States Senate has introduced legislation aimed at strengthening the resilience of Taiwan’s submarine cables.
AmCham Taiwan welcomes the introduction of the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act in the United States Senate, calling for greater monitoring, rapid-response protocols, and international cooperation to counter sabotage. The Chamber recognizes this bipartisan legislation as a clear demonstration of growing international support for Taiwan’s infrastructure security.
Taiwan has experienced at least 11 undersea cable disruptions since early 2023, many involving unidentified vessels. These incidents have affected not only international links, but domestic connections to outlying islands such as Matsu and Penghu, leading to prolonged outages in digital operations and communications services, further delayed by limited access to suitable repair vessels in the region.
If Taiwan’s undersea cables were severely compromised, the effects would reverberate across Asia. As a key hub for data transit between Northeast and Southeast Asia, outages in Taiwan could disrupt financial markets, cloud services, and cross-border communications throughout the region. Major economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore depend on stable connectivity via Taiwan. Any sabotage of these cables could have far-reaching consequences — impacting regional commerce, security coordination, and the resilience of digital infrastructure.
AmCham has long advocated for stronger cable resilience, including the acquisition of a dedicated repair vessel. Such a ship would significantly reduce response times, enhance Taiwan’s self-sufficiency, and mitigate risks from geopolitical disruption. However, the Chamber recognizes that ownership is costly and complex; a new-build cable ship can cost over US$200 million, and global supply is extremely limited.
Given these challenges, alternative strategies merit serious consideration. Taiwan could pursue long-term leasing, co-invest in regional consortium vessels, or deepen cooperation with trusted partners such as Japan, which has experience operating national cable ships. Joint standby arrangements could offer a practical path toward faster, more secure repairs.
Other interim solutions, such as modifying naval support vessels for emergency use, may provide valuable contingency options. Additionally, regulatory reforms to ease access to shared rooftops and conduits would boost network resilience and support 5G deployment.
While Taiwan has taken steps to enhance maritime monitoring and expand land-based backup systems, more comprehensive planning and coordination are still needed. That includes collaboration among telecom providers, coast guard authorities, and international partners committed to transparency and security in the Indo-Pacific.
Taiwan’s strategic location, economic importance, and democratic values make it a linchpin of regional digital connectivity. But it also makes it a target. Protecting submarine cables is no longer just a technical matter; it is a strategic imperative. Taiwan should seize the momentum created by U.S. engagement to accelerate its own investment, planning, and international cooperation.
Resilient infrastructure is the foundation of a connected, competitive, and secure Taiwan. Safeguarding Taiwan’s digital lifelines is no longer optional — it is essential to national resilience.
