Taiwan is implementing a whole-of-society initiative that integrates civil defense, economic security, and counter-disinformation efforts to enhance preparedness against external threats and internal crises.

“Everyone has a responsibility to safeguard Taiwan’s democracy and security,” Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te said during his 2025 New Year’s address. “We must gather together every bit of strength we have to enhance whole-of-society defense resilience and build capabilities to respond to major disasters and deter threats or encroachment.”

Taiwan, long accustomed to the specter of external threats, has begun rethinking its approach to resilience. On June 19, 2024, President Lai established three committees aimed at strengthening the island’s ability to withstand future crises: the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee, the National Climate Change Response Committee, and the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience (WOSR) Committee.

The WOSR Committee, in particular, has been shaped by shifting geopolitical realities, most notably Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which underscored the need to ensure government continuity, safeguard critical infrastructure, and bolster economic security in the face of potential conflict.

Lai’s WOSR initiative is structured around several key priorities. According to the Committee’s website, military preparedness is being reinforced through expanded civil defense programs, first aid training, and community crisis management efforts. Economic resilience is another central focus, with an emphasis on securing supply chains, protecting critical infrastructure, and safeguarding Taiwan’s semiconductor industry – an essential pillar of the global tech economy.

To combat misinformation and cognitive warfare – tactics often used to undermine public trust – Taiwan is launching public education campaigns and collaborating with technology platforms to counter disinformation. At the same time, the island is deepening its partnerships with allies, particularly in cybersecurity, intelligence-sharing, and coordinated defense strategies, further integrating Taiwan into a broader network of resilience against external threats.

“There hasn’t been anything quite like this initiative before in Taiwan,” says Drew Thompson, former director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. “It’s truly novel, and they’re building it as they go. That’s not necessarily a bad thing – it’s a practical approach that also reflects the administration’s sense of urgency.”

Shen Ming-shih, a research fellow at the government-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), the country’s leading military think tank, observes that Taiwan’s defense strategy has undergone significant shifts over the decades. During the Cold War, the focus was on total war preparations centered on repelling a large-scale invasion from China. In the post-Cold War era, as cross-Strait tensions eased, the military’s role expanded beyond traditional defense to include disaster relief and the protection of critical infrastructure.

That trajectory has shifted once again since the coming to power of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, whose expansionist policies and escalating pressure on Taiwan have prompted a renewed emphasis on resilience and security.

Beyond conventional military threats, China increasingly employs gray zone tactics – measures designed to intimidate and destabilize Taiwan without triggering open conflict. These include frequent incursions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), unidentified balloons drifting into Taiwanese airspace, and stepped-up patrols by China’s coast guard, all aimed at eroding public confidence and testing the island’s defenses.

In response, “Taiwan must integrate all of its past experiences and build a response mechanism that is suitable for both peacetime and wartime,” Shen says. Taiwan should remain prepared by maintaining social stability and economic growth while simultaneously bolstering its national defense to deter potential military action, he argues.

Whole-of-society solutions

A significant component of the initiative involves transforming Taiwan’s civil defense framework. The Ministry of the Interior is leading efforts to overhaul emergency response teams, expand alternative military service programs, and enhance volunteer firefighting capabilities. Social and religious organizations, NGOs, and private companies also play a role in training civilians and acting as distribution hubs for emergency supplies.

“Taiwan’s civil society has done a pretty impressive job of trying to respond to disinformation through organizations like DoubleThink Lab and Taiwan FactCheck Center,” says John Dotson, deputy director of Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), a D.C.-based policy incubator. “But on the government side, it’s a lot more difficult. There is no single agency that has clear authority.” Moreover, as in all liberal democracies, “whenever government agencies try to counter disinformation, it inevitably raises concerns about censorship.”

Other organizations are actively working to prepare and mobilize citizens. One example is Academia Formosana, a Taipei-based institution providing training programs, research, and advocacy initiatives aimed at promoting social justice, human rights, and civic engagement.

“Survival is a community effort,” says Ljavakaw Tjaljimaraw, also known as Samuel Morpheus, founder of Academia Formosana. “In an urban setting, you have very little resources, and most people have a sense of powerlessness. You don’t know each other. You don’t even know your neighbors. How would you protect each other during a crisis?”

Morpheus says that ensuring that Taiwan’s businesses and daily life continue uninterrupted is essential for sustaining public morale in times of crisis. To support this effort, the organization is leveraging the extensive network of Taiwan’s Presbyterian Church, which it likens to a modern-day “Noah’s Ark” – a protective vessel to carry citizens through crisis. This existing infrastructure can be repurposed for civil defense, functioning as a decentralized network of local disaster management centers equipped with food, water, electricity, medicine, communication systems, and logistics support, providing physical safety as well as mental and spiritual guidance.

Chen Hsin-liang, general secretary of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, serves as a member of President Lai’s WOSR Committee. With 1,300 congregations spread across urban centers, rural communities, and mountainous regions, the church maintains deep ties with many of Taiwan’s indigenous groups, making it a natural backbone for community resilience efforts. However, Morpheus acknowledges that while the Presbyterian Church offers an extensive network well-suited for civil defense, significant gaps remain in funding and infrastructure, limiting the full implementation of its goals.

Thompson, who is now a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, notes that there is significant opportunity for corporations operating in Taiwan to align their corporate initiatives with the government’s resilience priorities.

“Whole-of-Society Resilience is not just about countering an attack or invasion from China – it’s about strengthening Taiwan’s overall preparedness,” he says. “Companies can play a significant role by providing employees basic medical and first-responder training, such as CPR and emergency response skills. This empowers workers to act effectively in case of a medical emergency, workplace accident, or other crisis situations.”

In addition to enhancing workplace safety, such training fosters critical thinking, problem-solving ability, and a proactive mindset – skills that are beneficial in both professional and personal settings, Thompson notes. “This mindset of resilience and preparedness can be incredibly powerful. It also reinforces the strong sense of community already present in Taiwan.”

Meanwhile, Morpheus urges greater private sector involvement, particularly from U.S. businesses with economic stakes in Taiwan. He argues that investing in resilience not only benefits local communities but also serves the broader interests of American companies operating on the island. Ensuring Taiwan’s economic stability, he contends, is a strategic imperative for businesses that depend on its role in global supply chains.

Physical and mental measures

Physical resilience and protecting economic security are other key aspects of WOSR. As the world’s leading semiconductor manufacturer and a major supplier of electronics, functional textiles, base metals, fasteners, and other critical manufacturing components, Taiwan plays an outsized role in global supply chains, making its economic stability a critical national – and international – concern.

The Atlantic Council noted in a July 2024 report that the Taiwan government is increasingly working with major corporations and state-owned enterprises to reinforce supply chain redundancy, secure energy reserves, and protect against cyber threats. As part of the resilience strategy, Taiwan is also making long-term investments in stockpiling strategic materials, diversifying fuel sources, and securing food supplies to prevent economic coercion. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is spearheading efforts to expand Taiwan’s strategic energy reserves, strengthen the national power grid, and safeguard water supplies. Measures to fortify critical infrastructure from sabotage and external threats are also being accelerated.

Beyond physical security, the WOSR initiative tackles the increasingly sophisticated landscape of cognitive warfare. Taiwan is a frequent target of misinformation campaigns designed to sow division and weaken public morale. In response, the government is intensifying its efforts to combat disinformation, expanding fact-checking initiatives, and incorporating media literacy education into school curricula. Collaboration with international partners is also growing, with Taiwan exchanging best practices in countering hybrid warfare and foreign interference.

GTI’s Dotson stresses the importance of media literacy and civics education in equipping the public to recognize and resist cognitive warfare. He points out that changes in the information ecosystem have outpaced society’s ability to adapt, leaving gaps that authoritarian regimes and domestic actors can exploit.

“In my view, every high school should have both a civics curriculum and a media literacy component to help young people understand the reliability of different media sources,” says Dotson. “But that’s a tricky issue – once you start down that road, people will inevitably start screaming about censorship. Still, I believe it’s a fundamental need.”

INDSR’s Shen echoes this sentiment. “Internally, it is very important to use education to make people understand China’s expansionist intentions, the changing of the regional situation, and how Taiwan should respond,” he says.

Shen adds that in terms of countering cognitive warfare, Taiwan has established an excellent rapid response system. After receiving or seeing fake news and cognitive warfare, the National Security Council provides guidance, the ministries and commissions carry out actual countermeasures, and the information and psychological warfare forces are responsible for drafting future countermeasures.

Roadblocks ahead

Despite its broad ambitions, the WOSR initiative faces significant hurdles. Large-scale civil defense training in Taiwan’s densely populated cities presents logistical challenges, while the political opposition warns that the initiative could escalate cross-Strait tensions. Funding is another obstacle. Expanding civil defense, securing the economy, and countering disinformation requires substantial resources.

Several experts note that the success of the WOSR initiative hinges on sustained political commitment. Its core objectives – ensuring government continuity, maintaining essential services, and integrating civilian support into national defense – require long-term investment and organization.

“Coordination between national and local governments in Taiwan presents several challenges, particularly given the significant autonomy local governments have from Taipei,” says RSIS’ Thompson. One of the biggest hurdles, he adds, is the political divide, especially between Kuomintang (KMT)-controlled local governments and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led central government.

This dynamic “can create political costs for local officials who cooperate with presidential-level initiatives, sometimes leading to what may seem like petty political conflicts,” he says. “But then again, this is an inherent aspect of democracy.” Additionally, local governments do not appear to have significant representation in the WOSR Committee, suggesting that the campaign has not yet fully considered the role of local authorities.

That said, Thompson notes the inherent flexibility in President Lai’s approach, meaning that as the campaign progresses, there may be greater engagement with local governments. The initiative’s key objective at this stage is raising awareness and establishing a broader narrative of WOSR at the national level. Once this foundation is in place, efforts to integrate local-level stakeholders can be expected to follow.

Although efforts are made to reform training of civilian defense squads and reserves, GTI’s Dotson expresses skepticism about the feasibility of Taiwan creating a territorial defense force similar to that in Ukraine, citing cultural resistance and the poor state of Taiwan’s military reserve system.

“Taiwan has a reserve force that’s very large on paper, but in reality there’s very little meaningful training, and there’s a fundamental need to reform the system,” he says. “Instead, I think the greatest value of the Whole-of-Society Resilience effort will come from civil society groups providing logistical, medical, and disaster response support – areas where they already have experience and can effectively back up government agencies in a crisis.”

America’s role

As Taiwan navigates an evolving security landscape, the initiative paves the way for deeper U.S.-Taiwan cooperation. Experts suggest that U.S. government agencies and private sector partners could play a greater role in cybersecurity, emergency communications, and critical infrastructure protection. Assigning a U.S. Department of Homeland Security attaché in Taipei and a dedicated “Taiwan Desk” in the Washington headquarters could further streamline coordination between the two governments, they suggest.

Thompson notes that the United States can support Taiwan’s WOSR initiative by sharing best practices, particularly through agencies like the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The agency provides extensive resources to American citizens, including training, preparedness guides, and crisis management strategies – not only for disaster response but also for prevention. However, Taiwan lacks a centralized agency with a similar mandate for societal resilience, making direct U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in this area more complex.

Without a clear counterpart in Taiwan, U.S. emergency management agencies have limited avenues for engagement, he notes. While military, diplomatic, and commercial cooperation between the United States and Taiwan governments is well established, institutional ties between Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security remain weak. Their differing mandates and domestic focus further constrain potential collaboration.

To bridge this gap, Thompson says Taiwan must proactively define its needs – identifying specific areas where U.S. cooperation would be mutually beneficial. Rather than simply requesting assistance, Taiwan should present a clear value proposition, demonstrating how collaboration strengthens both nations. With increasing scrutiny in Washington over foreign aid and security commitments, it is essential to frame resilience cooperation as a strategic advantage for the United States.

Meanwhile, GTI’s Dotson emphasizes the value of expanding U.S.-Taiwan collaboration beyond military aid and training to include deeper engagement in civil resilience initiatives. He notes that Taiwan could benefit from partnerships with American NGOs and civil society groups that specialize in disaster response and logistical support. As an example, he cites Spirit of America, a U.S. NGO that has quietly engaged in disaster response training and logistical support, suggesting that similar initiatives could be expanded.

“Taiwan and the U.S. could benefit from greater interaction in areas like disaster response, crisis management, and information resilience,” he says. “If you look at Ukraine, civil society groups played a crucial role in supporting the government. Taiwan could follow a similar model, and there’s real potential for deeper collaboration with American NGOs and civil organizations in these non-military areas.”